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Approaches to Estimating the Health State Dependence of the Utility Function 
Amy Finkelstein, Erzo F.P. Luttmer, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo* 
If the shape of the utility function varies with health status, this will affect the economic 
analysis of a number of central problems in public finance, including the optimal structure of 
health insurance and optimal life cycle savings. We define health state dependence as the effect 
of health on the marginal utility of a constant amount of non-medical consumption. A priori, the 
sign (let alone the magnitude) of any health state dependence is ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
marginal utility of consumption could decline with deteriorating health (negative state 
dependence), as many consumption goods – such as travel – are likely complements to good 
health. In this case, the optimal amount of health insurance benefits would be lower than with 
state-independent utility, and optimal life cycle savings would decline (assuming health is 
expected to decline over the life cycle). On the other hand, the marginal utility of consumption 
could increase with deteriorating health (positive state dependence), as other consumption goods 
– such as prepared meals or assistance with self-care – may be substitutes for good health. If 
there is positive state-dependent utility, the optimal amount of health insurance benefits would be 
higher than with state-independent utility, and optimal life cycle savings would increase. Indeed, 
we have conducted stylized numerical calibrations which suggest that even a moderate amount 
of state dependence can have a substantial effect on the optimal level of health insurance benefits 
and a noticeable effect on the optimal level of life cycle savings (Amy Finkelstein, Erzo F.P. 
Luttmer, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2008). 
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In practice, however, almost all papers that estimate the demand for health-related insurance 
products or that calibrate individuals’ optimal life cycle savings assume state independence. This 
presumably does not reflect a consensus that the shape of the utility function does not vary with 
health status. Rather, it is indicative of the paucity of the empirical evidence demonstrating how 
the shape of the utility function varies with health, which in turn reflects the considerable 
empirical challenges associated with estimating this parameter. 
In this paper, we outline what we believe are the main possible approaches to estimating 
health state dependence. We distinguish two broad classes of empirical approaches: approaches 
based on individuals’ revealed demand for moving resources across health states, and approaches 
based on observed utility changes associated with health changes for individuals of different 
consumption or resource levels. We discuss the appeals and challenges of each, in turn. Our 
basic conclusion is that while none of these approaches is a panacea, many offer the potential to 
shed important insights on the nature of health state dependence.   
Table I: Examples of approaches to estimating health state dependence 
Approach Paper Findings 
Health insurance demand Not implemented N/A 
Effect of health on portfolio 
allocation 
Edwards (2008)  Positive state dependence (estimate is 
not quantified) 
Variation in consumption profiles 
across individuals with different 
health trajectories 
Lillard and Weiss 
(1997) 
Positive state dependence (marginal 
utility in sick state is 155 percent of 
that in healthy state) 
Sloan et al. (1988) Negative state dependence (marginal 
utility in sick state is 8 percent of that 
in healthy state) 
Viscusi and Evans 
(1990) 
Negative state dependence (marginal 
utility in sick state is 77 – 93 percent 
of that in healthy state) 
Variation in self-reported 
compensating differentials to 
hypothetical health risks across 
individuals of different income 
levels  
Evans and Viscusi 
(1991) 
No evidence of state dependence 
Variation in changes in subjective 
well-being in response to health 
shocks across individuals of 
different permanent income 
Finkelstein, 
Luttmer, and 
Notowidigdo 
(2008) 
Negative state dependence (marginal 
utility after a one-standard-deviation 
decrease in health is 89 percent of 
that in the healthy state)  
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We also describe (and summarize in Table I) examples of each approach and the resulting 
evidence on state dependence.1 Our main conclusion from the evidence to date is that there is 
scope (and need) for much more empirical work on this topic. Many of the approaches we 
describe have not been implemented or would benefit from additional investigations. In addition, 
the currently available estimates offer little in the way of a consensus on the sign or magnitude of 
health state dependence. 
I. Estimating state dependence based on the demand for moving resources across states  
1.A Demand for state-dependent assets  
A natural way to estimate state dependence of the utility function is to examine willingness 
to pay for products that offer state-dependent payoff streams. Health insurance is the obvious 
example. In a first-best world, health insurance equates the marginal utility of consumption 
across states of health. The nature of any state-dependent utility directly affects the optimal 
structure of a health insurance policy, and can therefore in principle be inferred from the policy 
chosen. Estimating state dependence off of health insurance demand is conceptually 
straightforward and appealing. In practice, however, researchers who attempt to operationalize 
this approach face (at least) two key challenges.  
The first challenge is that market imperfections may limit the range of health insurance 
options available, and hence preclude detecting certain types of state-dependent utility based on 
inferences from the observed set of health insurance contracts purchased. In particular, 
presumably because of obvious moral hazard issues, health insurance policies that pay out more 
than medical expenditures are never (to our knowledge) offered. Therefore, if marginal utility of 
                                                 
1 Our discussion does not include papers that estimate a state-dependence parameter as an ancillary parameter in a 
larger project (often estimated via functional form assumptions).  Such papers include, for example, John Rust and 
Christopher Phelan (1997) and Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John B. Jones (2006). 
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consumption were increasing with deteriorating health, this might not be detectable from 
observing the equilibrium purchases of currently available health insurance contracts.  
A second challenge is that insurance demand depends not only on how marginal utility varies 
with health, but also on other parameters of the utility function, particularly risk aversion. The 
higher the assumed level of risk aversion, the less positive (or more negative) is the state 
dependence implied by a given coverage allocation. There is an enormous range of estimates of 
risk aversion in the literature. For example, Alma Cohen and Liran Einav (2007) review studies 
that estimate coefficients of relative risk aversion ranging from 1 to over 50. Inferences about 
state dependence from health insurance allocations could therefore be quite sensitive to plausible 
assumptions about risk aversion. 
A potentially promising way to circumvent both these challenges would be to estimate the 
willingness to pay for the last dollar of comprehensive (i.e., full medical expense reimbursement) 
insurance coverage.2 Imagine, for example, that an individual has a choice between two 
insurance contracts: one that provides comprehensive coverage of all medical expenditures, and 
one that provides comprehensive coverage except for a $1 deductible. The willingness to pay in 
the healthy state for the last dollar of coverage in the sick state is equal to the marginal utility of 
consumption in the sick state relative to the healthy state, times the probability that the sick state 
arrives. Since the contract with the $1 deductible provides virtually full insurance, consumption 
in the sick state is only marginally lower (by $1 to be precise) relative to the healthy state, and 
such a small variation in consumption should have a negligible direct effect on the marginal 
utility of consumption in the sick state for any plausible curvature of the utility function (i.e., any 
coefficient of risk aversion). This means that the ratio of marginal utility in the sick state to 
                                                 
2 We are grateful to Wojciech Kopczuk for suggesting this idea to us. 
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marginal utility in the healthy state derived from the willingness to pay provides an estimate of 
state dependence that should be insensitive to the level of risk aversion. 
To be implemented cleanly, this “willingness to pay” approach requires observing the choice 
between comprehensive coverage of all medical expenditures and slightly less coverage. Such a 
choice is likely to be hard to find in practice. Thus, as a practical matter, estimates of state 
dependence are likely to be affected to some degree by the assumed curvature of the utility 
function. How sensitive the estimates of state dependence are to this assumption will depend on 
how close to comprehensive (and to each other) the contracts analyzed are, as well as what one 
thinks are reasonable ranges for risk aversion.3  
We know of no studies that have used information on health insurance demand or health 
insurance contracts to estimate health state dependence. We consider this an interesting and 
potentially quite fruitful direction for further research. A closely related approach would be to 
examine demand for assets that have returns that are correlated with an individual’s health. 
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, such assets do not exist in practice. 
Even though asset returns are uncorrelated with individual health, Ryan D. Edwards (2008) 
argues that it is nevertheless possible to estimate health state dependence from asset allocations. 
Specifically, he shows that an increase in the probability of uninsured health shocks will lead 
people to reduce their demand for risky assets if the marginal utility of consumption decreases 
with health (positive state dependence). However, this relationship depends on assuming a 
functional form for utility in which positive state dependence occurs if and only if the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion exceeds one. Using data from the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics 
Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD), Edwards (2008) finds that those who perceive a higher 
                                                 
3 In addition, implementation requires exogenous variation across individuals in the price they face for different 
health insurance contracts, so that one can cleanly estimate demand; such variation is not ubiquitous but may be 
available in specific applications. 
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probability of uninsured health shocks hold a lower share of their assets in risky securities. For 
the assumed functional form of the utility function, this finding indicates positive state 
dependence. In addition, inferences about health state dependence from asset allocation also 
require that changes in health do not have a direct effect on portfolio choice as they might, for 
example, if health affects life expectancy.  
1.B Consumption profiles 
One might also try to infer state dependence from the relationship between health and the 
time profile of consumption. Optimizing individuals will adjust their consumption path to 
increase consumption in periods when marginal utility is high and decrease it in periods when 
marginal utility is low. Thus variation in the consumption profile across individuals with 
different health trajectories reveals the relative demand for resources across different health 
states. 
The conceptually cleanest way to implement this approach would be to examine differences 
in consumption profiles across otherwise similar individuals who face different expected health 
shocks. At a practical level, however, it is likely to be quite difficult to identify currently similar 
individuals with different expected health trajectories. Potentially, one might try to use 
information on genetic or other medical tests that convey information about the probabilities of 
later onset of conditions that are currently asymptomatic to try to implement this approach. One 
might also try to examine the profile of consumption paths over a time period that spans the ex-
ante expected recovery from a transitory health condition (such as a broken leg). We know of no 
studies that have attempted to infer health state dependence from the difference in consumption 
profiles across individuals of the same demographics but with different expected health 
trajectories. One reason may be that data containing information on such expected health 
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trajectories are not commonplace. However, we believe they could provide an exciting and 
potentially quite fruitful opportunity for estimating state dependence.  
It is probably easier to obtain data in which one observes individuals experiencing 
unexpected adverse health events, such as the onset of diabetes in one but not another observably 
similar individual. Since the individual life cycle budget constraint must be satisfied (resources 
must be consumed or left to the next generation), inferring state dependence from the 
consumption profile of individuals who have experienced different unexpected health events 
requires (in contrast to inferences based on expected health events) strong assumptions about the 
nature of bequest motives. Estimates of state-dependent utility using this approach can be 
sensitive to what is assumed about bequest motives (another subject on which there is little 
consensus). For example, is a decline in consumption following an unexpected negative health 
shock evidence that the marginal utility of consumption is lower in poor health or is it evidence 
of the individual having a strategic bequest motive (raising the bequest to induce children to 
provide more care)?  
We know of only one paper that attempts to infer health state dependence from consumption 
profiles across individuals with different health trajectories. Lee A. Lillard and Yoram Weiss 
(1997) build a structural model of consumption in which the marginal utility of consumption 
depends on health but the marginal utility of bequests does not. They infer consumption in the 
Retirement History Survey from income flows and asset changes, and compare consumption 
paths across individuals who vary both in experienced health shocks and in expected health 
shocks (expectations are based on demographic characteristics). They estimate that the marginal 
utility of consumption in the sick state is 55 percent higher than that in the healthy state (i.e., 
positive state dependence).  
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As the discussion of Lillard and Weiss (1997) illustrates, another challenge in estimating 
state dependence off of consumption trajectories is that it requires panel data with broad-based 
consumption measures (in addition to health measures). This is a relatively high data hurdle, 
especially because it is crucial that one have a broad measure of consumption, rather than merely 
observing a single component of consumption (such as the measure of food consumption in the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics); what matters for questions such as the optimal level of 
insurance is not how consumption may substitute across categories but what happens to total 
consumption. Lillard and Weiss (1997) circumvent this problem by using income flows and asset 
changes to infer consumption. The need to proxy for consumption that is not directly observed is 
also a challenge for the papers that attempt to implement the next class of approaches.  
II. Estimating state dependence based on observed utility changes associated with health 
events at different consumption levels 
An alternative approach to estimating health state dependence is to estimate the variation 
across individuals of different consumption levels in the utility change they experience with a 
given health shock. This is both as simple and as hard as it sounds. It is conceptually simple in 
that it directly estimates the cross partial derivative of interest (how the marginal utility of 
consumption varies with health or, equivalently, how the marginal utility of health varies with 
consumption), and practically difficult due to the inherent difficulty in measuring marginal 
utility. 
II.A Compensating differentials 
One potential path is to estimate compensating wage differentials associated with various 
job-related health risks. The marginal utility of health is given by the product of the 
compensating differential times the marginal utility of consumption. The degree of state 
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dependence can be found by estimating how the marginal utility of health varies across 
individuals with different consumption levels. 
This approach, of course, faces all of the well-known challenges involved in estimating 
compensating differentials. An additional challenge is estimating (or proxying for) the curvature 
of the utility function – i.e., how the marginal utility of consumption varies with consumption. 
The sign and magnitude of the estimate of state dependence could be quite sensitive to the 
assumed or estimated curvature of the utility function; as noted earlier, the large range of 
estimates on the coefficient of relative risk aversion indicates that there is little consensus about 
this curvature. 
In a series of papers, W. Kip Viscusi and co-authors implement this compensating 
differential approach. The authors survey individuals regarding the amount of money they would 
require to compensate them for hypothetical exposure to specific health risks, and examine how 
these self-reported compensating differentials vary with income (their proxy for consumption). 
Using this basic approach, William N. Evans and W. Kip Viscusi (1991) find no evidence of 
state-dependent utility, W. Kip Viscusi and William N. Evans (1990) estimate that the marginal 
utility of income in the diseased state is between 77 percent and 93 percent of the marginal utility 
in the healthy state, and Frank A. Sloan et al. (1988) estimate that the marginal utility of income 
in the diseased state is only 8 percent of that in the healthy state. The wide range of estimates 
obtained in different versions of this approach may reflect differences in the diseases studied and 
populations examined. Viscusi and Evans (1990) estimate the state-dependent utility of chemical 
workers by comparing the survey responses of workers with different incomes to questions 
concerning the amount of money they would require to compensate them for hypothetical 
exposure to new chemicals such as asbestos or TNT. Evans and Viscusi (1991) apply this same 
 10
approach to consumers exposed to different hypothetical injuries from insecticides or toilet bowl 
cleaners, and Sloan et al. (1998) examine individuals with and without multiple sclerosis faced 
with varying hypothetical probabilities of acquiring (or being cured from) the disease. The 
different estimates obtained by these different studies may also reflect their different assumptions 
regarding the curvature of the utility function. 
II.B Utility proxies 
A second potential way to estimate marginal utility is to use utility proxies such as subjective 
well-being. One can then estimate in a panel how the utility proxy changes in response to health 
shocks, and how this change varies across individuals of different consumption levels. One 
attractive feature of this approach is that, unlike all of the other approaches discussed thus far, it 
does not require that individuals are able to forecast the shape of their utility function in a 
different health state in an unbiased manner.  
Counterbalancing this attraction are important concerns about the use of subjective well-
being as a proxy for utility. Subjective well-being measures surely contain a great deal of noise 
relative to any signal value, which creates problems for the precision of estimates of state 
dependence. More importantly, for the approach to produce unbiased estimates of state 
dependence, it is necessary that subjective well-being or a monotone transformation of it can be 
interpreted as a cardinal measure of utility that is comparable across individuals with different 
levels of resources. One can select the monotone transformation such that the curvature of the 
implied underlying cardinal utility function matches existing estimates of risk aversion. 
However, given the considerable range of estimates of risk aversion in the literature, there will 
likely be a range of plausible monotone transformations. Estimates of state dependence could 
potentially vary a great deal (and in sign as well as magnitude) within the range of plausible 
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monotone transformations. Finally, this approach requires panel data with either broad-based 
consumption measures in addition to health measures (a similarly high data hurdle to that 
required by using consumption profiles), or additional theoretical assumptions (as in Finkelstein, 
Luttmer, and Notowidigdo, 2008).  
Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2008) implement this approach using panel data on 
the elderly from the Health and Retirement Survey and permanent income as a proxy for 
consumption; they estimate that relative to an individual who is healthy (i.e., has no chronic 
diseases) a one-standard-deviation increase in the number of chronic diseases is associated with 
an 11 percent decline in the marginal utility of consumption.  
III. Conclusion 
Health state dependence of the utility function can have important implications for a range of 
economic behaviors. Yet we have relatively little empirical evidence on health state dependence, 
and what we do have is inconclusive in both sign and magnitude. We have sketched a number of 
potential, promising approaches to empirically estimating health state dependence. Some have 
not, to our knowledge, ever been attempted. Others have been implemented but would benefit 
from additional explorations using different populations, data, or assumptions. 
Beyond the first-order question of the average health state dependence in the population, it 
would also be interesting to learn more about variation in health state dependence. The nature of 
health state dependence may well vary across different diseases, or across different individuals 
(e.g., of different ages). There may also be important non-linearities (or even potential non-
monotonicities) in the effect of health on the marginal utility of consumption. All of these are 
interesting and important questions for further research. 
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